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Knowing by Hand: 
Embodied Knowledge in Higher Education in the Disciplines of Art and 
Design   
 
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of 
knowledge? – is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, 
a hinderer or a helper?  
        Plato (Phaedo)1 
 
Forms of knowledge that are practical, situated and embodied have traditionally been 
valued, validated and supported in higher education in fine art and design. However, in 
the period since the early 1960’s a number of socio-political and broader cultural 
developments have impacted on the status of such knowledge, with the result that it has 
become less and less of core concern within these disciplines.  This phenomenon might 
be regarded as a re-entrenchment of older, sometimes latent, but nonetheless deep-seated 
attitudes, which valorise propositional and conceptual knowledge as more properly 
intellectual, more befitting the “scholastic view” – a disposition Pierre Bourdieu 
characterises as fundamentally antagonistic to practice, being “indifferent to context and 
practical ends, [a] distant and distinctive relation to words and things” and furthermore 
sustainable only in the context of school: “… that time liberated from practical 
occupations and preoccupations”2.  
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Within the still emerging field of practise-based research in these disciplines there is 
considerable debate, indeed anxiety, regarding the validity of what are sometimes called 
“non-traditional” conceptions of knowledge, including the knowledge claims of practice 
as well as the role of the body and of emotion and perception in knowledge.  
 
Higher education in art and design, particularly in Britain and Ireland, has in the 
intervening period seen considerable rationalisation.  Schools of art and design, formerly 
rather autonomous institutions, have come under the auspices of the universities, where 
they compete for research funding with equivalent institutions in the disciplines of 
science and the humanities by applying to boards and authorities whose criteria, to a 
considerable degree, reflect the more established research culture of those disciplines.  
This state of affairs perhaps inevitably tends to promote the phenomenon of “academic 
drift,” a tendency to emulate the knowledge paradigms of mainstream academia.  This 
economic impetus is combined with an academic one, brought about since the 1960’s by 
the introduction of BA, MA and MFA awards and, laterally and perhaps most 
problematically, PhD degrees in the area of practice-based and practice-led research.  The 
criteria applied to PhD research is normally the contribution of new knowledge to a 
particular discipline.  Therefore questions naturally arise as to what constitutes 
knowledge in the fine arts and design, as well as other questions concerning the 
knowledge claims of practice and the sometimes fraught relationship of practice to 
theory.  
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The “Linguistic Turn” has strongly impacted on the humanities in the latter part of this 
period, particularly under the influence of continental philosophy, with the effect of 
underpinning the hegemony of language-based propositional and conceptual paradigms 
of knowledge.  While Jacques Derrida’s maxim “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (there is 
nothing outside of the text), ought not, perhaps, be taken completely at face value, as 
Martin Jay points out: “everything that goes under the rubric of "vision" might be 
understood as a textual construct for Derrida rather than a perceptual experience.” Jay 
reminds us of Derrida’s statement: “I don't know what perception is and I don't believe 
that anything like perception exists.”3  However, the importance of perception for 
meaning, thought and knowledge is, as we shall see, gaining greater appreciation.  
 
Yet another factor is the Duchampian legacy (Marcel Duchamp 1887-1968) and the 
ascendancy of approaches to art and art making which assert the primacy of the concept 
over the physical and situated aspects of the artwork, the practical means of its production 
and its mode of consumption.  The impact of this on the teaching of art and design in 
higher education cannot be overestimated.   
 
In conceptualist strategies the role of emotion and of perception, as well as the 
significance of the senses, are minimised. This ascendancy is evident in contemporary 
debate regarding practice-based research. The following is from a report of art 
educational theorist Sarat Maharaj’s address to the recent “Art and Wisdom” conference 
in Seville:  
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Maharaj considers that our approach to the type of knowledge that plastic arts 
generate, must assume that it does not deal with a retinal experience (the 
terminology of Duchamp), because since the beginning of the 20th century most 
aesthetic creation has incorporated formal and discursive elements that escape 
from the field of action of the surface of the eye.4  
 
 
It is of significance that while certain philosophical traditions, notably Pragmatism and 
Phenomenology, are sympathetic to the truth claims of practice, conceptual art theory is 
more strongly indebted to analytic philosophy, which Mark Johnson has pointed out is in 
this regard singularly antipathetic.  The artist Joseph Kosuth makes clear this 
indebtedness, with specific reference to A.J. Ayer’s ‘analytic method’: “…the artist, as an 
analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things, He is concerned 
only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his 
propositions are capable of logically following that growth… Accordingly, we can say 
that art operates on a logic.”5 
 
Kosuth’s words are not intended merely to refer to a particular style or movement.  For 
him, ‘all art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists 
conceptually’.6    In this view the role of the senses and perception within the visual arts 
is usurped by a “logic” grounded in propositional/conceptual meaning.  As Johnson 
points out, much analytical philosophy is fundamentally compromised by a mind-body 
dualism.7 Kosuth minimises the role of the body in the processes of making and 
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appreciating art; the situated aspects of art are similarly negated. This eviscerated and 
detached conception of art appeals solely to the intellect – the Cartesian intellect isolated 
from both the body and the physical environment. Leading conceptual artist Sol LeWitt is 
even more emphatic in this regard:  
 
 
Conceptual art is made to engage the mind of the viewer rather than his eye or 
emotions. The physicality of the three-dimensional object then becomes a 
contradiction to its non-emotive intent ...  Anything which calls attention to, and 
interests the viewer in this physicality is a deterrent to our understanding of the 
idea...8  
 
 
Rosalind Krauss described the dominance of the grid as a formal device in painting in the 
latter half of the twentieth century as: “what art looks like when it turns its back on 
nature.”9  Conceptual art, as outlined above, is what art looks like when it turns its back 
on the body.  
 
Johnson characterizes analytical philosophy (instancing Ayer) as effectively bracketing 
emotive meaning as “non-cognitive.”  In this way it retains what he sees as an: 
“…exclusive focus on the conceptual/propositional as the only meaning that mattered for 
our knowledge of the world.  So-called emotive meaning had no place in science or any 
allegedly rigorous, empirically testable modes of knowledge.”  
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By contrast, Johnson holds that there is in fact ‘no cognition without emotion’ and, more 
significantly, that second-generation cognitive science suggests “meaning is shaped by 
the nature of our bodies, especially our sensorimotor capacities and our ability to 
experience feelings and emotions.”10  For Johnson as for John Dewey before him, 
meaning and knowledge are fundamentally situated – spatially, socially and emotionally.  
Moreover just as there is no radical mind/body separation, subject/object dualism is also 
false.  As Eric Bredo explains: “put simply the inside outside relationship between person 
and environment is replaced by a part/whole relationship.”11  Johnson posits an enactive 
and situated approach founded in Pragmatist philosophical theory whereby “subjects and 
objects are really just abstractions from the interactive of organism-environment-
transactions.”12   
 
There are, however, broader cultural imperatives at work.  Richard Woodfield describes 
the instigation of PhD’s in fine art as resulting from ‘changes brought about by the 
decline of modernism and the current role of ‘theory’ in fine art practices: “From 1968, 
few artists in education could afford to be naïve in relation to ideology… Radicalism 
emerged as a deep requirement of interesting artistic practice and as ideology has to be 
articulated verbally to become recognised. Grunt practice garnered no respect.”13 
 
Nevertheless, theorists as diverse as Martin Heidegger, John Dewey and Pierre Bourdieu 
recognise that, with regard to knowledge, the body primarily asserts itself through 
practice.  Heidegger argued that, “the kind of care that manipulates things and puts them 
to use… has its own kind of knowledge.”14  The valorisation of conceptual, propositional 
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and language-premised knowledge represents for him a regrettable “absolutization of the 
theoretical”. 
 
The dualism of theory and practice is, according to Dewey, rooted in Greek 
disenchantment with custom.  Practice also shared in this “philosophic depreciation”, 
resulting in a “magnification in higher education of all the methods and topics, which 
involved the least use of sense-observation and bodily activity.”15 As he sees it, a 
fundamental dualism of leisure and labour is reflected in the Greek elevation of bios 
theoretikos over bios praktikos: “As livelihood and leisure are opposed, so are theory and 
practice, intelligence and execution, knowledge and activity. The latter set of oppositions 
doubtless springs from the same social conditions which produce the former conflict.”16 
 
The socio-political origins of these oppositions are significant, as is their perennial 
reassertion in Western culture.  It is to this that Bourdieu refers when he observes that 
“through oppositions like that between theory and practice, the whole social order is 
present in the very way that we think about that order.”17  Within mainstream Western 
epistemology association with physical labour carries negative connotations.  However 
when we deny the body its role we ignore important aspects of all knowledge.  
Acknowledging this, Bourdieu defers to Pascal – who wrote that “we are as much auto-
matic as intellectual” and this automation is of the body.  As Bourdieu explains:    
 
 
Pascal thus recalls the difference, which the scholastic existence leads one to 
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forget, between what is logically implied and what is practically entailed through 
the paths of habit which, ‘without violence, without art, without argument, makes 
us believe things’. Belief, even the belief that is the basis of the universe of 
science, is of the order of the automaton, the body, which, as Pascal never ceases 
to remind us, 'has its reasons, of which reason knows nothing'.18 
 
 
Somewhat ironically, while the disciplines of fine art and design are wracked with 
anxiety about the knowledge claims of practice and strive to accommodate dominant 
conceptual/propositional models of knowledge, these very models are being called into 
question by the philosophical traditions of Pragmatism and Phenomenology – traditions 
that are currently being invigorated by developments within research in cognitive science.  
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Dewey foresaw this, suggesting that all 
knowledge is embodied, enactive, and situated; he refers to nascent developments in this 
field: 
 
 
No one who has realized the full force of the facts of the connection of knowing 
with the nervous system and of the nervous system with the readjusting of activity 
continuously to meet new conditions, will doubt that knowing has to do with 
reorganizing activity, instead of being something isolated from all activity, 
complete on its own account.19 
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 Drawing and Knowing  
It is useful at this point to focus on a practice that for almost four hundred years had been 
the linchpin of art and design education: the practice of drawing.  Drawing in the 
Renaissance period was elevated, in the context of the philosophically complex Italian 
term disegno, to an overarching theory.  The first Florentine art academy was tellingly 
named the Accademia del Disegno (1563).  Ann Bermingham explains that disegno 
referred to drawing in two species, both to “the initial mental conception and to its linear 
execution” (my emphasis).  She recognises however that the term left room for a 
polemically convenient “slippage… between conception and execution, or between 
design and drawing… [which was] essential in reorienting the visual arts away from craft 
and towards the more elevated and intellectual liberal arts”.20  
 
Georgio Vasari’s conception of disegno attempted to sidestep these dilemmas through a 
progressive holistic theory that integrated disegno’s intellectual and embodied aspects. 
However, his contemporary Federico Zuccaro criticised him for conflating disegno 
interno (presented in idealist, neo-platonic terms) with the practical and embodied 
aspects of drawing he termed disegno esterno, which he saw as “secondary and 
necessarily inferior.”21  Here we see played out in the context of Renaissance art theory 
the kind of perennial socially driven polemic recognised by both Dewey and Bourdieu.   
 
David Rosand points out that as a concept disegno is “fraught with contradictions and 
ambivalences, located as it is at the very boundary between mind, hand, idea and form.”22  
Dewey captures the zeitgeist in describing the similarly low status of another hands-on 
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practice – experimental science – within the scholastic universities of this period, 
wherein “the aristocratic tradition, which looked down upon material things and upon the 
senses and the hands, was still mighty.”23  
 
The intellectual excitement and artistic confidence of the Italian Renaissance then opened 
a space whereby the epistemological significance of intelligent making was given 
unprecedented recognition by theorists like Vasari in the face of more reactionary 
tendencies (Zuccaro’s theory laden-approach for example).  This represents a conflict that 
Carl Goldstein describes as persisting within art and design education up to the Bauhaus 
period, i.e., a “problematising of the relationship between theory and practice, and… a 
‘deconstruction’ of theory in a resolutely dialectical engagement with it as something 
demonstrably different from practice.”24 
 
Dewey points out that “the brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal 
adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses 
directed upon it” and he cites examples of such ‘consecutive activity’ as a carpenter’s 
work or that of “an etcher at work [drawing] upon his plate.” The work is “continuous, 
consecutive, or concentrated in that each earlier act prepares the way for later acts, while 
these take account of or reckon with the results already attained – the basis of all 
responsibility.”25  In like mind, Erik Bredo, working in the field of “situated cognition” 
emphasises the situated aspect of such work.  Drawing, he tells us, is a drawn out affair:  
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…one draws, responds to what one has drawn, draws more, and so on. The goals 
for the continuation of the drawing change as it evolves and different effects 
become possible. Acting with the environment in this way contrasts with acting 
on it, because it presupposes that it will turn round and alter oneself in return… 
Such performances are often described in artistic terms acknowledging interplay, 
such as "concerted, "orchestrated," or "composed."26 
 
 
The actions of drawing are not merely an intelligent maker’s skilled performance. 
Drawing can be a supremely complex embodied and situated process integrating action 
with intensely heightened perception.  Johnson suggests that such a description fits many 
interrelated modes of what we call thinking: “perceiving,” as he tells us, “is a mode of 
thinking, just as thinking appropriates the resources and mechanisms of perception.”27 
Johnson cites Rudolph Arnheim, who held that thinking consists of “cognitive 
operations” which far from being at a remove from perception are in fact “the essential 
ingredients” of perception: “I am referring to such operations as active exploration, 
selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, analysis and synthesis, 
completion, correction, comparison, problem solving, as well as combining, separating, 
putting in context.”28 
 
This list mirrors quite precisely the operations of descriptive drawing.  However, these 
insights regarding perception are hardly new.  In On Vision and Colour (1816) Arthur 
Schopenhauer wrote the following  
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All intuitive perception is intellectual, for without the understanding we could 
never achieve intuitive perception, observation, the apprehension of objects.  On 
the contrary, we would stop short at a mere sensation that might possibly have 
meaning in reference to the will as pain or comfort; but for the rest it would be a 
succession of states devoid of meaning and nothing like knowledge.29 
 
 
Alva Noë proposes an “enactive approach to perception” whereby perception is 
understood as not merely dependent on but indeed “constituted by” our possession of 
sensorimotor knowledge.30  His theory presents vision as an interaction with the 
environment more analogous to a blind person using their stick than to understandings 
that appeal to “internal representation” or the “pictures in the mind” paradigm.  Like 
Johnson and indeed Schopenhauer, Noë holds that “all perception is intrinsically 
thoughtful” and that “perception and perceptual consciousness are types of thoughtful, 
knowledgeable activity.”31  
 
Noë radically challenges “intellectualism,” suggesting that all propositional knowledge, 
“knowledge-that,” is in fact dependent upon and “must be analysed in terms of a more 
basic and essentially active knowledge-how.” This assertion casts new light on the value 
of practical knowledge and its substructural relationship to propositional knowledge.  
Indeed Noë insists that the “key” to his theory is that perception “depends on the 
possession and exercise of a certain kind of practical knowledge.”32  This leads him to 
question common assumptions regarding the singularity of conceptual knowledge, an 
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attitude that tends to inform the “scholastic view” which clings to the above dualism.  As 
he puts it: 
 
 
The understanding of concepts is usually supposed to be a paradigm of personal-
level accomplishment. But just as there is no sharp line between the personal and 
the subpersonal, so there may be no sharp line between the conceptual and the 
nonconceptual. Indeed, it may be that sensorimotor skills deserve to be thought of 
as primitive conceptual skills.33  
 
 
Noë thus dissolves the dualistic distinction between conceptual or propositional 
knowledge on the one hand and non-conceptual or perceptual, tacit knowledge on the 
other.  
 
In a view that seems to support that of Noë, Mark Johnson argues that “mainstream 
philosophy of mind and language” represents an “impoverished view of meaning” which 
tends to “over-intellectualize many aspects of human meaning making and thinking.”  He 
challenges what he describes as “the seriously mistaken claims that meaning and thought 
are exclusively conceptual and propositional in nature and that the apparatus of meaning, 
conceptualization, and reasoning is not intrinsically shaped by the body…”34  
   
Johnson, in his own work and that with George Lakoff, asserts that all of our knowledge 
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is fundamentally rooted in our bodily immersion in our physical milieu, from which, 
through a process he calls “metaphorical conceptualisation” – in keeping with Dewey’s 
principle of continuity – our more complex concepts evolve.35 Johnson tells us that 
“every act of perception already involves a capacity for abstraction.”36  In this regard he 
cites Arnheim’s comment that “in the perception of shape lies the beginning of concept 
formation.”37 
 
In the context of the above Pragmatist understandings, the claim of drawing as a practice 
to constitute a form of knowing may be seen as resting on its role as a situated, interactive 
process of enactive perception and concept generation.   
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